Independent security research and services initiative

Security research for systems that act.

Contextual Trust explores how organisations can secure AI agents, strengthen digital trust and prepare for cryptographic change. We translate research into practical guidance, architecture and security services for teams building and operating complex technology.

Start the free Security Check See proposed services →

Available now: a self-reported Security Check and educational library. Guided services and security-agent capabilities are in development. This site does not scan, monitor or change your systems.

Discover the estateControl consequential actionsPrepare cryptographic change
A practical first step

A clearer plan for your next security improvement.

Answer questions about accounts, recovery and AI use. Get an explained action plan, track tasks and export your report. Answers stay on your device until you request a verified report, with optional browser saving.

Start the free Security Check → CAE enterprise assessment → Request access and service pricing →

Areas of focus

Trust across the technology estate.

Six areas we are exploring. Each links to the material we have published so far.

AI and agentic security

Identity, authority, context integrity, tool permissions and controlled actions for agents that can act.

Read: AI agents

Discovery and assessment

Finding the agents, models, software, hardware, data access and cryptographic dependencies that a system relies on.

Read: crypto inventory

Digital trust

PKI, certificates, key management and cryptography, treated as operational dependencies with owners.

Read: certificates and PKI

Quantum resilience

Crypto-agility, post-quantum readiness and migration planning, starting from an inventory.

Read: post-quantum

Security at scale

Tenant isolation, monitoring, audit evidence, recovery and operating costs as design requirements.

Read: security at scale

Blockchain and smart-contract security

Introductory material on blockchain attack surfaces. Smart-contract security is an area we are exploring, with no dedicated guidance published yet.

Read: blockchain security

How to read this site

Research, guidance, services and product plans are different things.

Research · in progress

Research

Open questions and reasoned perspectives. No original research results are published yet, and nothing here should be read as an evidence-based finding.

Available now

Educational guidance

The free Security Check, security library and short insights. The check uses self-reported answers and versioned rules; articles include conceptual diagrams and source links.

Proposed

Services

Reviews and assessments described below. None is open for booking, and we make no claim about delivery capacity or past engagements.

Planned

Product capabilities

A security agent for agentic environments. It is a design direction: there is no hosted scanner, no customer data handling and no operating service.

Security-agent direction

From discovery to controlled action.

A shared view of agents and their dependencies should lead to decisions teams can explain, review and recover. These are design goals for the proposed product.

Discover and connect

Map agents, models, tools, identities and data access alongside software, hardware, certificates and cryptographic dependencies. Keep observed evidence separate from declarations and unknowns.

Assess and protect

Review permissions, untrusted context and high-impact tool actions. Apply policy where actions execute, with an explicit owner and a route for human review.

Operate and evolve

Design for tenant isolation, bounded workloads, evidence freshness and recovery. Use cryptographic inventories to plan and test post-quantum transitions.

See the architecture, discovery scope and delivery stages →
Services

Proposed security services.

These describe the support we aim to offer as the initiative develops. They are proposed or in development. We do not claim certifications, a staffed delivery team, partnerships or customer results.

Proposed

Agent security review

Review what an agent can access and do: identity, delegated authority, tool permissions, untrusted context and who approves consequential actions.

Proposed

Estate discovery and cryptographic inventory

Scope and structure an inventory of agents, models, software, hardware, data access and cryptography, with evidence and coverage gaps made visible.

Proposed

PKI, certificate and key-management review

Map certificate ownership, expiry and renewal, and key-management dependencies, to find critical dependencies and missing owners.

Proposed

Quantum-readiness and migration planning

Turn an inventory into priorities, supplier questions and a tested transition plan. This is planning support, not a statement that a system is quantum safe.

Proposed

Security-at-scale architecture review

Examine tenant isolation, monitoring, audit evidence, recovery and operating-cost design for complex platforms.

Proposed

Blockchain and smart-contract security review

Scope to be defined. Not offered until delivery capability is established and the scope is written down.

Interested in any of these? Tell us what you are trying to secure. An enquiry does not create an engagement or a commitment on either side.

Insights

Start with the practical questions.

Short explainers and original conceptual diagrams for teams considering their next steps.

1. Giving an AI agent the right authority

An agent may need to retrieve information or propose an action. That does not mean it should inherit every permission held by the person who asked. Identify the agent, scope its permissions to the task, and check the relevant rules at the point where an action is committed.

A useful review question: if approval expires while a workflow is waiting, can the system detect that change before carrying out the action? Design an explicit route for review when conditions cannot be established.

Source: NIST: identity and authority of software agents.

2. Where to begin with post-quantum readiness

Start with what exists. Identify the services that rely on public-key cryptography, where certificates and keys are managed, and which components depend on suppliers. The result is a starting inventory, not proof that a system is quantum safe.

Prioritise critical services and data that needs protection for a long time. Ask suppliers how their products will support migration, and test compatibility before changing production systems. Timelines and algorithm choices depend on the organisation and applicable guidance.

Source: Australian Cyber Security Centre: questions to ask vendors.

3. Certificates: a small dependency with a large footprint

Certificates support trust between systems, but their ownership and renewal can be spread across teams and vendors. A useful first step is to map where certificates are used, who owns them, when they expire and how they are replaced.

Use the map to identify critical dependencies and missing owners. Include certificate lifecycle in broader resilience and cryptographic transition planning.

Contact

Discuss a security challenge.

Contextual Trust does not have its own mailbox or contact form yet, so we have not published either. Enquiries go through the contact page of Contextual Agentic, the related enterprise architecture initiative. Please mention Contextual Trust in your message and avoid sending confidential information.

Contact via Contextual Agentic ↗